Changes in the cultural and value structure: the presence of unregulated media pluralism led to the fragmentation of the unified national discourse, which contributed to the prominence of sub-identities at the expense of the comprehensive national identity. In addition to that, the value system witnessed a noticeable change, as there was a shift from values of comprehensive national belonging to the entrenchment of subcultures.
Social justice policies: approaches and applications
First: Redistribution of income policies
The government support system came through a package of direct support, represented by social welfare, as the continuation of the blockade program (1990–2003), but with high costs amounting to (8–10 billion dollars annually), and fuel support, which constituted nearly (15–12 billion dollars annually). The number of beneficiaries increased significantly as a result of direct cash support to vulnerable groups, where it rose from 1.7 million families in 2015 to 4.7 million families expected in 2025, with females representing 75% and males 25%. In return, external debt rose to 33.6 billion dollars, while internal debt increased as a result of financing budget deficits during the past years. The number of employees rose from 850 thousand (2003) to 5 million (2025), and the wage gap expanded according to the unified salary scale system and job grades. The phenomenon of political employment also worsened, and the public job was transformed into a special quota for the modern class.
Second: Policies of equal opportunities and empowerment
These policies were implemented through education and health, as free education was adopted with adherence to the principle of equal opportunities. However, educational outputs did not keep pace with the growth of the population and the geographic and demographic distribution, which led to the migration of approximately 40% of academics and talented individuals. As for the health sector, the free health care system that Iraq faced shows great challenges, including the lack of hospitals and specialized centers in the governorates, and the presence of great disparities between the Kurdistan Region and other areas. In addition to that, health services were linked to the security situation, as areas that were not secure suffered a deterioration and decline in medical services.
Third: Corrective and inclusive policies
Transitional justice was applied through a set of measures, including compensation for victims and the reinstatement of employees who were dismissed for political reasons under Article 145 of the Iraqi Constitution. It also included central trials such as the trial of Saddam Hussein and others, and the application of the law on aiding disaster victims. However, these measures faced criticism from human rights organizations due to the lack of comprehensive social justice policies. Women’s representation in parliament and local councils was set at 25%, but women’s participation in the labor market declined from 24% in 1990 to 18% by 2025, coinciding with rising rates of violence against women and weak social protection policies for widows and divorcees. In correctional institutions, the absence of effective authority led to the deterioration of the conditions of prisoners and detainees, as their numbers decreased from 1.5 million to less than 300 thousand.
Intervening institutions and evaluation of their performance
Constitutional institutions: include the High Commission for Human Rights; limited impact, and the Integrity Commission; constrained by political interference, and the Board of Supreme Audit; limited capabilities and weak oversight.
Executive institutions: represented by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs; transformed into a welfare tool, and the Ministry of Planning; responsible for strategic planning, and the Advisory Commission (Council of Ministers); subject to political considerations in development priorities.
Analytical evaluation of results and indicators
Quantitative indicators:
Official estimates provided by the World Bank indicate that the Human Development Index in Iraq reached 28.6% in 2006, and rose to 29.5% in 2012, and then to 29.8% in 2024. The poverty index showed relative stability between 29.8% and 30%. The most prominent indicator of inequality in distribution can be seen in the gap between governorates, as the south and rural areas witness high rates of poverty and unemployment.
Qualitative indicators:
Corruption perception index: Iraq recorded 26 points out of 100 in the corruption perceptions index for the year 2024 announced by Transparency International. The corruption index in Iraq reached 18.86 points since 2003 until 2024, and Iraq ranked at the global level in 2024 at 26.00 points, down from a level of 13.00 in 2008.
Human development index: in the National Human Development Report 2025, Iraq entered for the first time the category of high human development, recording an index of 0.712 for the year 2024, reflecting progress in health, education, and income, with an improvement in life expectancy to 74 years, and a decline in poverty and unemployment as a result of good social and economic support.
Gender gap index: in Iraq, the wage gap is connected to factors of a social and cultural nature, where women face weakness in representation within high-wage jobs despite achieving levels of education comparable to men. Women’s participation in the labor market did not exceed 13% compared to 68% for men, which reflects the large gap in economic opportunities.
Structural and economic challenges
Challenges of the political system: represented by consensual democracy, it turned into a monopolization of power, and quota-based power-sharing as a rentier mechanism dominated all joints of the state, and the weakening of civil parties; the domination of sub-identities over programs.
Economic challenges: represented by excessive rentiers; oil revenues constitute 97% of the budget revenues, and the war economy and corruption; parasitic economic networks, and the weakness of the private sector; 80% of the labor force in the informal and semi-formal sector.
Security and societal challenges: represented by the fragile state; lack of monopoly over legitimacy and violence, armed groups and multiple centers of power; erosion of state authority and societal fragmentation; weakening of national social cohesion.
Comparative analysis with previous periods
In comparison with the period preceding 2003, the positives of the post-2003 period can be summarized in the presence of freedom of expression and political pluralism, and the entry of marginalized groups into the political process. However, the 2003 period lost centralization and state cohesion, while in return there was better distributive justice.
Comparison with similar international experiences
In Lebanon, the consociational power-sharing system shows persistent political complexities and repeated failure to achieve stability. As for South Africa, the transitional justice experience reached the achievement of full inclusiveness. In Kosovo, improvements were achieved in governance and reconstruction within the framework of international supervision.
Influential external factors
The American direct role: manifested through the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA); the imposition of the free-market model, extreme privatization, dismantling of the public sector as a substitute for efficiency, and interference in legislation in a manner that imposed Iraqi interests.
Regional influence: role of neighboring states in supporting sectarian and armed groups, and the Iranian model and its influence on Shiite parties, and the Gulf model; impact of the rentier economy on political culture.
International organizations: represented by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; austerity conditions and restructuring of the security apparatus; limited role in national reconciliation, and civil society organizations; influence through funding conditions.
Future scenarios and proposed policies
Possible scenarios: the first scenario, continuation of the current situation, which leads to the exacerbation of crises with a gradual deterioration in the level of basic services. The second scenario, gradual reform, in which the possibility of achieving partial social justice within the existing structure emerges. The third scenario, radical change, which requires a major political transformation followed by building a comprehensive welfare state.
Proposed reform policies:
Constitutional reform: re-drafting social and economic articles.
Progressive tax system: to finance better social services.
Transforming the rentier economy into a productive one: investment in agriculture and industry.
Radical institutional reform: building a state of institutions instead of a state of quotas.
Balanced regional policies: addressing disparities between governorates.
Conclusion: lessons and recommendations
Social justice policies in Iraq after 2003 shifted from being a tool for achieving equality and social solidarity to a mechanism of hegemony and political control. The political system based on sectarian quota-sharing emptied the concept of social justice of its real content, and transformed it into a political rent distributed according to loyalties and sub-affiliations.
Main lessons:
Genuine social justice cannot be achieved without a real democratic political system.
Social justice is not merely the distribution of resources, but rather an integrated institutional system.
Structural corruption undermines any attempt to achieve social justice.
External influence can constitute a fundamental obstacle to national policies.
Future research recommendations: an in-depth sociological study of class structural transformations after 2003, and an economic analysis measuring the effectiveness of social protection programs, and a comparative study of transitional justice models in post-conflict societies, and an anthropological research on the transformation of social values associated with justice.