Iraq entered, after the November 2025 elections, a political phase that can be described as a re-formed extension of what preceded it, with no break from it and no radical renewal of it. The political system did not produce a historic moment of transformation, but it rearranged its internal balances in a more complex way, especially within the Coordination Framework in the Shiite political house, which remained the actual holder of the levers of executive decision-making, even if it appeared more divided and less capable of producing a unifying leadership. These elections did not express a broad popular surge, but rather a general mood that tends to avoid the unknown and prefers monitored continuity over an unguaranteed adventure, in light of the weakness of cross-sectarian alternatives and the absence of a clear-featured national political project. In light of the above, the future of the political path and the challenges facing the executive authority can be read through the following axes:

The political path in light of the continuation of the Sadrist withdrawal from the political process
After the parliamentary elections in 2025, the Sadrist withdrawal from the political scene was no longer an emergency event or a temporary tactic, but rather transformed into a structural factor influencing the re-formation of the Iraqi political path. This absence, with what the Sadrist movement carries of popular weight, a history of protest, and an ability to break balances, left a vacuum that was not actually filled, despite the attempts of the Coordination Framework forces to re-control the scene and manage it with the tools of traditional authority. The political equation became calmer on its surface, but more fragile in its depth, because the achieved stability was not the product of national consensus, but the result of the absence of the actor most capable of surprise.

Thus, the continuation of the Sadrist withdrawal granted other Shiite forces, especially the Coordination Framework, a rare opportunity to manage the state without a competing Shiite partner that possesses street legitimacy, especially after the decline of the movements and forces of the civil current. However, this opportunity quickly turned into a burden on the political scene in Iraq, as the political system lost one of the elements of internal balance. The Sadrist movement represented a constant pressure element on authority, whether from inside parliament or outside it, and its absence removed this pressure.

The political path after 2025 was characterized by a higher ability to form governments and pass understandings, but it lacked political vitality. The political process came to be managed by specific persons without a real popular extension, which made political legitimacy depend on consensus among influential forces rather than on societal authorization. Here, specifically, the effect of the Sadrist withdrawal appears: no other force emerged capable of representing the Shiite street or absorbing its protest energy within the institutional framework, which left this street in a state of dormancy, not in a state of satisfaction.

At the parliamentary level, the absence of the Sadrist bloc contributed to weakening the idea of organized opposition. The council turned into a space of consensus and a reflection of executive authority, where roles are distributed among forces close in vision and interests, which reduced the chances of serious oversight and effective accountability, in addition to disabling the legislation of laws or legislating some of them in a manner of political consensus or one component-based and political authority. It also weakened democratic practice, and made parliament less responsible toward the popular mood and more connected to behind-the-scenes understandings.

As for the executive authority, the political blocs, especially the Shiite ones, benefited from the absence of the Sadrists in reducing the level of political confrontation, but they faced a different challenge represented in the absence of popular cover when making difficult decisions. A government that does not face strong opposition, but also does not enjoy broad public support, is more exposed to shaking at the first economic, service, or security crisis. In this sense, the Sadrist withdrawal was not a factor of permanent stability, but a deferred stability. In the relationship between components, the Sadrist absence contributed to re-adjusting the balance within the Shiite house in favor of the Framework, which reflected on the form of the relationship with Sunnis and Kurds. Partnerships became clearer and less tense, but also more pragmatic and less connected to a unifying national project.

Accordingly, the political path in Iraq after 2025, under the continuation of the Sadrist withdrawal, is heading toward a fragile political and partisan stability, based on managing balances rather than treating them, and on reducing confrontation rather than building societal consensus. The Sadrist movement, while outside authority, is still present as a force of absence, not a force of participation, and its decision to return or continue withdrawal will remain a decisive factor in the future of the political system. The Iraqi equation has proven that the absence of major actors does not end crises, but postpones their explosion, and that true stability is not achieved except through the participation of all within the rules of a just state and effective institutions.

The political path in light of the Framework conflict over the position of Prime Minister
The political path in Iraq can be read in light of the conflict within the Coordination Framework over the position of Prime Minister, which escalated after the announcement of the results of the November 2025 elections, as a concentrated expression of a leadership crisis and of a defect in the mechanism of producing decision, in addition to being a dispute over persons. The relative progress achieved by the blocs linked to Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, alongside the rise of Asaib and the cohesion of the rest of the Framework forces, was not the result of a broad wave of popular trust as much as it was a reflection of a pragmatic vote that chose the least turbulent option in a stage dominated by political anxiety. The Iraqi voter, exhausted by previous experiences, did not vote for the dream of the state, but for the version of the possible state, capable of managing the minimum level of stability without grand promises. However, this progress carried within it a structural contradiction that soon erupted inside the Framework itself. Al-Sudani, who originally came as a compromise candidate, not a project candidate, was able during his term to achieve a degree of relative administrative success, whether in the file of security stability, adjusting the economic rhythm, or managing foreign relations. This success, instead of turning into a supportive political asset for him within the Framework, turned into a source of concern. The forces that supported him did not expect him to transform from a stage manager into a holder of position, and from an executor of balances into a figure that may possess the capability of gradual independence from the system of collective control.

Here, precisely, the essence of the conflict is embodied. The Coordination Framework, as an alliance of forces, not a party or unified coalition, is based on the principle of sharing influence, not producing leadership. Any prime minister who succeeds more than necessary automatically becomes a problem, because he threatens to redefine the relationship between the position and the blocs, and between the state and the organizations. Therefore, the potential exclusion of al-Sudani from a second term did not stem from his failure or poor performance, but from his limited success and his political, administrative, and financial expansion, which proved that he is capable of building a network of relations inside state institutions and outside them without fully passing through the Framework’s channels.

On the other hand, the Framework did not have a ready alternative that enjoys consensus. The hypothesis of returning al-Maliki for a third term remained excluded due to internal political and religious-establishment rejection and regional sensitivity. Meanwhile, the former prime minister Haider al-Abadi remained outside the circle of serious competition due to the weakness of his bloc and the erosion of his political presence. This equation produced a leadership crisis within the Coordination Framework, where the question was no longer who is stronger, but who is less costly. This crisis indicates a structural defect in producing political leadership within the system, and turning the position of Prime Minister into an arena of managing conflict, not embodying a project.

No other name succeeded in combining relative popular acceptance and the ability to manage internal balances. This vacuum made the conflict revolve in a closed loop: rejecting renewal for al-Sudani without the ability to produce a convincing alternative, which brought the political process into a state of calculated waiting, in which the state is managed without strategic resolution. This conflict reflected on the nature of the political path as a whole. The apparent stability that followed the elections was, in its essence, an elite stability, based on suspending disputes, not resolving them. The government works, parliament legislates, but the big decision is postponed. This postponement does not reflect political wisdom as much as it reflects fear of breaking the fragile balances within the Framework, because any resolution may lead to an internal split that is difficult to contain.

In this sense, the conflict over the position of Prime Minister after 2025 was not merely competition over executive authority, but a conflict over the shape of the system itself: does the Prime Minister remain an employee of balances, or does he become the head of a real executive authority? Is success allowed within the system, or is it punished? These questions remained without a clear answer, which made the Iraqi political path move forward with calculated steps, but lacking the courage to leap toward deeper reform. Thus, it can be said that the Coordination Framework succeeded in maintaining its formal unity, but it has failed so far to solve its basic dilemma of producing strong leadership without threatening its internal structure. As long as this problem is not resolved, the position of Prime Minister will remain a focal point of deferred conflict, and the political path will remain revolving in the orbit of temporary stability, not sustainable state-building.

The political path under the form of component-based political understandings
Political blocs try to reach understandings about the political composition of the three presidencies, and this came as a reflection of this fragile balance. The selection of Haibat al-Halbousi for the presidency of the Council of Representatives represented a re-entrenchment of Sunni leaderships capable of negotiating and controlling the rhythm of the component, in light of the absence of alternative Sunni forces with a unifying national discourse. As for selecting Adnan Faihan as deputy speaker of parliament, it entrenched the presence of the Framework forces, especially Asaib, within the legislative institution, in a step that carries a clear indication of the transfer of weight from the street and weapons to parliament without a break with either of them. Thus, parliament became a space of intersection between politics and security, not an independent oversight arena.

Therefore, the relationship between the three components remained governed by the logic of necessary partnership, not national integration. The Shiites hold decision, but they are divided over it. The Sunnis are partners in administration more than they are decision-makers. The Kurds maintain their traditional negotiating role with the rise of their internal economic and political crises. As for minorities, their presence remained formal, summoned to complete the picture, not to make policies, which keeps the concept of citizenship incomplete and suspended.

From the above, the continuation of the political path after 2025 seemed possible in form, but troubled in content. The system is able to produce governments, but unable to produce real opposition. The Council of Representatives, in light of the absence of organized opposition, turned into an institution of passing and consensus more than an instrument of oversight and effective legislation. This absence weakened the democratic balance and made accountability subject to political understandings, not institutional accountability.

The form of the political path under the challenges that will face the Iraqi government
The form of the political path for the next stage will remain hostage to the ability of the Iraqi government and the political forces that form it to address a number of internal and external files. Among the most prominent of those files are the following:

In the file of financial and administrative corruption, the handling continued selectively. Corruption is no longer an individual deviation, but part of the structure of the rentier system, linked to parties and networks of influence, and protected by complex political and legal balances. Any serious attempt to address it collides directly with the ceiling of the system itself, which makes real reform postponed or partial.

As for the file of the weapons of factions and tribes, it remained the clearest indicator of the limits of the state’s authority. The state did not decide to settle, and the factions did not decide to withdraw completely, and between them is a policy of temporary containment that avoids explosion but accumulates weakness. This file is not managed as a sovereignty issue, but as a balances issue.

Accordingly, the coming Iraqi government will find itself facing heavy internal challenges: unemployment, poverty, a services crisis, housing, and postponed legislation, at a time when better financial resources may be available, but without proportional administrative and executive capacity. Success here will not be in launching promises, but in the ability to reduce the gap between the state and society.

Regionally, Iraq will continue the policy of cautious balance, especially in its relationship with the United States, trying to avoid turning into an arena of direct conflict, benefiting from its geographic position and political weight. However, the fragility of the internal situation makes any regional escalation a direct threat factor to stability, and Iraq after 2025 may head toward a path that can be described as troubled continuity: a state that is managed by crises, not built by resolution; and a policy that postpones the big questions instead of answering them. The real challenge here will not be in forming the next government, but in the system’s ability to redefine the meaning of the state, the role of opposition, and the limits of authority. Otherwise, stability will remain temporary, reform postponed, and anxiety open to all possibilities.